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XHTRCBUCtlOH*

The essence of democracy rests in an enlightened
populace*

To insure literacy auong its people and to prepare

them to live upright, honorable and useful lives in a
democratic state, our nation established free public education.
The education offered to a free people should afford each
Individual the opportunity to go forth well informed and
well equipped in the basic principles of life.

In our school

program, standards have been established whose attainment
harmoniously develops the Intellectual, volitional, emotional,
physical and religious powers of man.

It is by training the

whole man teat we have in the past and will in the future,
continue to send forth progressive citizens to maintain the
growth and prosperity of our country.
The educational standards established in our school
systems and the type and mode of instruction which has been
and is now being received by the youth of our land, are
best understood from a review of school law and a perusal
of State and federal Supreme Court decisions affecting this
law.

This article, from an analysis of Supreme Court

decisions involving expulsion, answers questions pertinent
to the scholastic, disciplinary and patriotic training
no?/ being administered in our public schools.

3.
Section A*
Decisions Arising from expulsion because of refusal
to obey knoYm rules and regulations establish

the degree

to which we can discipline students in our public schools.
Tills is reviewed in Chapter II.
Section B.
The duties of the school co iaittee and teachers in
developing and maintaining a suitable curriculum and
advancement standards are clearly defined by the Judgments
.

.

rendered in expulsion cases curieing from scholarship. _
This is reviewed in Chapter III.
Section C.
Opinions handed down by *->tate and Federal Courts in
cases involving the expulsion of members of a particular
sect, the Jehovah Witnesses, for refusal to salute and
pledge allegiance to the flag emphasize

the importance of

patriotic ceremonies in our school program.

This is

reviewed in Chapter IV.
The conformity of school law within the several
states allows us to restrict the sections on scholarship
and discipline to an analysis of cases in the New England
States.

In Section C all cases in the United States

pertaining to the expulsion of the
are reviewed.

Jehovah Witnesses
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©ISCIPLIJSB.
Discipline la the conformity of an individual
in conduct and behavolr to established atanoardo
which are conducive to good orderly working
conditions.
ihis portion of the article by a perusal of
State Supreme Court decisions involving expulsion for
misconduct proposes to answer the following questions:
1.

liat is the extent of the authority granted

to school committees to make rules and regulations
for governing the schools?
2.

lay the ochool committee expel a student

who does not conform to the rules and regulations?
3.

Kay the school coi^nittee expel a student

for improper action off the school premises?
4.

Are the decisions of the school committee

subject to revision by the courts?
5.

Dust every etatezaent regarding the maintenance

of the schools be formally voted and recorded by the
school committee?

.

6
6.

Is a pupil entitled to a hearing by the

school committee before being permanently excluded
for misconduct?
7.

Is a pupil present for a hearing before the

school committee entitled to reveal all the facts
in the case?
a.

Y/hat authority is granted to teachers to

maintain discipline in the schools?
9.

Is corporal punialiment by proper authority

Justified?
10,

Hay an individual expelled from a public

school bring an action against the city or town?

7

STATUTES GOVERNIm SCHOOL HISCIPLIHE.

In order that

the decisions rendered by the Courts may be more
clearly understood, the educational laws governing
discipline in I'ass&chusetts are listed below.

MASSACHUSETTS.
Chapter 71, Section 37.
Duties of school
coraaittec.
It shall have general charge of all the
public schools, including the evening schools and evening
high schools and of vocational schools and departments
when not otherwise provided for.
It may determine,
subject to this chapter, the n imber of weeks and hours
during which such schools shall be in session, and may
make regulations as to attendance therein.
Chapter 71, Section 47 (As amended 1935, 199).
Committee may supervise athletic and other school
organisations.
The committee may supervise and control
athletic and other organizations composed of public
school pupils and bearing the school name and organized
in connection therewith.
It may directly or through an
authorized representative determine under what conditions
the same may compete with similar organizations in other
schools.
Expenditures by the committee for the
organization and conduct of physical training and
exercises, athletics, sports, games and play, for
providing proper apparatus, equipment, supplies, athletic
wearing apparel and facilities for the same in the
buildings, yards and playgrounds under the control of
the committee, or upon any other land which it may
have the right or privilege to use for this purpose and
for the employment of experienced athletic directors to
supervise said physical training and exercises, athletics,
sports, games and play, shall be deemed to be for a
school purpose.
Chapter 76, Section 17.
Pupil not to be excluded
without hearing.
A school committee shall not permanently
exclude a pupil from the public schools for alleged
misconduct without first giving him and his parents or
guardian an opportunity to be heard.

8

LAW CASKS INVOLVING EXPUiaiOH FOR MISCONDUCT.

A brief

digest of misconduct cases in Massachusetts, Connecticut
and Hew Hampshire follows.

HENRY HODGKINS VS.

INHABITANTS OF ROCKPORT

105 lass. 475
In June, 1068,

the plaintiff, a pupil in the Rockport

High School, Rockport, Massachusetts, was excluded from
school for alleged misconduct,

i.e. whispering, laughing,

acts of playfulness and rudeness to the other pupils,
inattention to study, conduct tending to cause confusion
and distractthe attention of other scholars from their
studies and recitations persisted in after repeated
remonstrances and admonitions by the teachers and members
of the committee.
The counsels for the plaintiff argued

that the

dismissal was irregular because two members of the school
committee expelled the boy prior to the vote of the full
committee.
In superior court, trial by Jury was waived and the
court ruled that the action could not be maintained, and
found for the defendants.

9
The State ouprene Court on the question of whether
or not the exclusion was lawful, gave the following

judgment:
1.
(38)

Sixteenth (16th)

section of Chapter thirty-eight

of the General Statues provides that the school

committee,

"shall have the general charge and superintend¬

ence of all the public schools in town."

‘this general

power, by necessary implication, included the power to
make all reasonable rules and regulations for the discipline,
government and management of the schools, and also the
power to exclude a child from school for sufficient cause.
2.

3chool committees are required by law to visit the

schools frequently,

for the purpose of inquiring "into the

regulation and discipline of the schools and habits and
proficiency of the scholars therein;" and they are thus in
a situation to Judge better than any other tribunal, what
effect such misconduct has upon the usefulness of the school
and welfare of the other scholars; and if they exercise
this power in good faith, their decision is not subject
to revision by the court.
3.

School committee acted in good faith on the

question within thoir discretion and upon which their
action Is conclusive when they excluded the plaintiff
from school, "on account of his general persistence in

.

10

disobeying the rules of the school, to the injury of
the school."
4.

:<o force is seen in trie objection that the

proceedings of the school committee was irregular.
t.

lower of the school corsraittee can be delegated

to its various members and the teachers.

In this case,

two members ofthe committee sent the plaintiff from
school, and on the same day reported the case to the
full committee, who unanimously voted to exclude him.
There is no irregularity in these proceedings which
gives the plaintiff a right of action against the
town; the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain this
action.

HUS8K1X YS. IYUNFITUJ)
116 lass. 366
A member of the School Committee of the Town of
Lynnfleld, Massachusetts, made the following rule which
was assented to by the two remaining members of the
committee:
"In consequence of much tardiness during the last
school term, I made the rule that whrn a scholar was twice
tardy,

that the teacher send the scholar to me."

.

11

On April 24 the plaintiff mm tardy for the second
time.

She waB told to report to the school committee

member; instead, she went directly home.

For this dis¬

obedience she waB suspended from school until she would
conform to the roles.
The plaintiff declaring that she had been unlawfully
suspended, sought damages.
1.

She argued that:

olnce the expulsion, wade for disobedience of a

rule relating to tardiness, had been wade by a member of
the school committee without a vote of the board or a
vote confirming same, the expulsion is unlawful.
2.

Kxawination of the bdoles of the school committee

showed no record that the rule had been made or
confirmed.
3be Superior Court ruled for the defendant,

the

case was then referred to the Supreme Court which,
upholding the lower court, ruled:
1,

School committees are required to have general

charge and superintendence of all public schools in town
and

to keep a record of their vote, order and proceed¬

ings; this doeo not imply that all rules and orders
required for the discipline and good conduct of the
school shall be a matter of record with the committee

12 •
or that every act in regard to the management of each
school in these respects should be authorized or
confirmed by formal vote,
2.

Reasonable exercise on the part of the teacher

of the poT/er necessary to punish disobedience and promote
the proper government and discipline of the school was
in this instance in no -way diminished by the fact that
tiie teacher acted under the direction of one member of
the committee according to a rule made by him but
expressly approved by each of the other members*

JOHN F. DAVIS V3. CITY OF BOSTON
133 Kass. 1G3
The plaintiff, a child fourteen (14) years of age,
attending a public school in the City of Boston, was
expelled by a teacher for failure to submit to punishment.
The plaintiff had been disobedient and impertinent
in school and the
punishment.

teacher had reason to administer corporal

The boy refused to submit to punishment and

was sent to the school principal;
home.

The child returned

instead he wont right

to school several days later and

professed a willingness to submit to the punishment.
However,

b< fore the punishment was completed, he refused

to submit to further punishment and was sent to the
principal; again he went home.

13,

After the above incident, profeesing willingness
to submit to punishment, then refusing to undergo
complete punishment, had been repeated several times,
the teacher ordered the boy home and told him he could
not return to class until he had submitted to punishment.
At a meeting of the plaintiff, his father and the
principal, hr. baton, the plaintiff stated

that he was

ready to receive the punishment but that he would not
say that he was willing to receive such punishment.
Since I'r. baton, by order of the school committee, could
not punish the plaintiff unless he was willing to receive
such punishment, he ordered the boy to go home and said
that he would not have him in school unless he was
willing to be punished.
The plaintiff maintained that:
1,

The teacher acted without authority in expelling

the boy from school, and brought an action against the
city for damages for unlawful expulsion,
2,

The punishment inflicted on him by the teacher,

when he refused to submit to further punishment by her,
was excessive.
The Superior Court Judge ruled that the evidence
offered bythe plaintiff was not sufficient to sustain

14

action and directed a verdict for the defendant.
The SupreisiaiaCourt handed down the following ruling;
1*

Plaintiff has no right to bring an action against

the city without first appealing to the school committee.
2.

Unless the teacher is acting under some order of

the committee, the only way of ascertaining whether the proper
authorities, for whose action the city or town is made
responsible, have excluded the child is by appealing to the
school committee; no appeal was m de in this case.
3.

To hold that whenever a teacher sends a child home

as punishment, the parent may treat it as an expulsion, and
sue the city or town, would lead to vexatious litigation,
and impair the diolpllne and usefulness of the schools.
4.

Plaintiff in this case, therefore, has failed to

show an expulsion from school for which the city is liable.

WILBERT A. BISHOP V3. IHHABITAtfTS 03? ROWLEY
165 Mass. 460
In accordance with Chapter 71, Section 37 of the General
Laws pertaining to education,

the School Committee of Rowley,

Massachusetts, adopted the following rule:
*As a punishment for disobedience or misbehavoir on
the part of the pupil, his teacher should send him to the
school committee, or seme member thereof, for a permit to

15

return to the school and such pupil should not be
allowed to return to the school without such p€?rmit."
A student whose name was not known to the teacher
was seen throwing gravel against a class room window.
The teacher asked the plaintiff , a pupil in her room,
the name of the boy; although the plaintiff knew the boy’s
name, he refused to tell.

Claiming that the plaintiff’s

manner was disrespectful and

impudent, the teacher excluded

him from the school until he should receive permission
from the school committee to return.
fhe plaintiff refused to apply to the school committee
for permission to return.
The plaintiff's father applied to the school committee
for & hearing concerning the alleged misconduct but the
committee refused to give such a hearing.
Through counsel, the plaintiff requested

the Judge to

rule that there had been an unlawful exclusion from a
public school within the meaning of the statutes; and
that he was entitled to recovor damages therefor.
The Judge of the lower court ruled for the defendants;
no unlawful expulsion; plaintiff not entitled

to any

damages.
The State Supreme Court, reversing the ruling of
the lower court, handed down the following decision:

16

1.

School committee has the right to expel a

student from school and if the school committee acts in
good faith in determining the facts in a particular case,
its decision cannot be revised by the courts,

2•

In the present case, the facts were in dispute

and a hearing was asked for on the question of fact and
it was refuseo.

Under these circumstances,

the permanent

exclusion of the plaintiff from the school was unlawful.
The school committee should have given the plaintiff or
hie father & chance to be heard upon the facts.

The

plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to maintain an
action against the t own,

JIORRISOIf V3. LAWR3NCB
181 Base. 127
In the following case the plaintiff was accused by
the high school principal of inciting other pupils to
write articles for a local newspaper criticising the
principal.

The pupil denied the accusation, bit the

principal persisted in his accusation and the pupil was
finally expelled from school.
The plaintiff sought damages from the public schools
for alleged unlawful exclusion on the grounds that he
was not granted a fair hearing before being expelled.

17

Following is a review of the hearing granted to the
plaintiff.
1.

The principal read a written statement of what

he contended to he the facts in the case.

The principal’s

report named a number of hoys, pupils at the school, as
persons from whom he got some of his information as to
part of the plaintiff’s alleged misconduct.

Counsel for

the principal read a written indorsement of the principal
signed by other teachers in the school which was prepared
by

the sub-master of the school.
2.

Counsel for the plaintiff was refused permission

by the chairman of the board

to call any pupil to be

examined on a question between the principal and a student.
The counsel for the plaintiff stated that the only evidence
he

tad was

the testimony of the accused and his fellow

students, some of whom had been referred to ir

the statement

of the principal, and if he could not call them he could
go no further.

The chairman of the board then said that

any boys who wished to volunteer a statement on the matter
or contradict anything said of him by the principal might
do so.
3.

Hone of the boys volunteered any testimony.
The school committee

then voted to sustain the

action of the principal in suspending the plaintiff and
that the plaintiff be fornally given leave to withdraw

18.

from school.
allowed

The boy did not withdraw and

to attend

Having heard

the

school.

the record of proceedings at

school committee hearing,
that

the question was:

boy a fair,
before

was not

the judge instructed

Did

the
the jury

the school committee give

the

reasonable opportunity to present his case

them

If they did,

If they did not,

the

jury were

to po no further.

the city was liable.

The jury founo for

the plaintiff.

The case was then submitted to the State Supreme Cuurt
which if it found

that the rules and

instructions on the

question of liability were erroneous, was to set aside
verdict and
1.

grant a new trial.

the

The court ruling follows.

The committee undoubtedly believed that a compulsory

examination of pupils in regard

to matters which they

probably consider confidential, would be detrimental to
the interests of
2.

the

school.

v© cannot hold

tnat a hearing in regard

to the

exclusion of a pupil from a school must be conducted
with all

the formalities

a ranterI'd mistake,

of a trial in a court or that

innocently made by a school committee

in conducting a hearing, will make his exclusion unlawful.
3.

Since it has not been contended

was acting

other than in good

that there was an error in
of liability.
4.

Hew trial ordered.

the

that the committee

faith, we are of the opinion
instruction on the question

19

MOHR I SOS VS.

XAWHKNCB

186 Kass. 456
At
127),

the new trial ordered by the Supreme Court

the jury on

committee acted

(181 Kaos.

the question whether or not the school

in good faith,

returned a verdict for the

plaintiff in the sum of ?750.00 and the defendant’s alleged
exceptions.
The decision of the Supreme Court on the alleged
exceptions,
1.

follows:

The jury after hearing in detail the

school committee meeting, had
pursuing this course,

eport of the

to d^tt>rmine whether in

the school committee were actuated by

a spirit of judicial fairness,

or whether

their conduct

was susceptible of other interpretations.
2.

As none

as witnesses,

of the pupils present offered

the

themselves

legitimate effect of the decision was

to

cause tne exclusion of lawful evidence that might have been
Introduced
and
of

and

that was material

to the plaintiff’s defense,

could not be supplied from any othrr source.
procedure when

intelligently adopted by a tribunal charged

with an impartial Investigation of fact,
a determination of

This method

to be followed by

the rights of the plaintiff cannot be

considered a hearing in the accustomed sense,
an inquiry of a jut iclal character.

or to denote

20

o.

If the course pursued was found to exhibit on their

part either prejudice against the plaintiff whose conduct
wne uncer investigation, or wilful indifference to his
righto,

there would be evidence to support an allegation

that they were not acting with a desire to raeet the full
requirements of ouch a hearing, but intentionally went
outside of them for some purpose that, whether wrongful
or lawful, equally resulted in a wrong to him.
4.

The decision of the Jury granting dnrnges to

plaintiff is approved;

s»ABJti:ns Jassa

the

exceptions over-ruled.

v;;.

city of Fitchburg

211 Hass. 66
In 1908 Paulino Jones, tho plaintiff, was suspended
from a public school In Fitchburg, Huaoachusett», by
principal Fopkins for refusing tc obey hiu directions.
It was further stated tiiat she could return to school on
the condition tiiat she submit to tue direction of the
principal of the school.
The plaintiff sought damages for unlawful exclusion
from the public schools.
grounds

Such action was br.scd on the

that the plaintiff should not have been expelled

without first having received a hearing before the school
committee

.

21

The lower court found for the plaintiff, judging the
exclusion to be unlawful.
The iiupreiae Court, concurring, rendered the following
d* cision:
1.

The general management of the public schools

having been conferred on the school committee,

the

plaintifffe exclusion was not unlawful, unless they acted
in violation of the provisions which require that a hearing
be granted before a permanent exclusion for discipline
is made.
2.

The plaintiff,s father adoressed a written

application to the committee asking that a statement in
writing be furnished giving reasons for his daughter’s
exclusion.
request,

The school committee upon receiving this

should have held a hearing and decided the question

whether she had been guilty of insubordination, and their
decision affirming the order,

if made in good faith,

would be final.
3.

dince the committee did not grant a hearing but

voted to inform him that the plaintiff had been suspended
for refusing to obey the principal’s directions, and that
she could return to school at any time upon acceding to the
authority of the principal, the lower court was warranted
in finding that the severance of the plaintiff from the

22

school Tor what amounted

to a permanent exclusion

could not be justified unless preceded by the hearing.

AiiTSLL VS. 3TGKHS
237 Hass. 103
The School Committee of the City of Haverhill*
Has.- achuoetts* passed

the folloting rule entitled;

"Regulations on fraternities and her or i ties.**
f0n and after hay 15, 1933, no student in the
Haverhill High School Shall be pledged to or join a
secret organization composed wholly or in part of
high school pupils, unless said organization is
approved by the Superintendent and xTincipal of
Haverhill High School, nor shall a student member or
student members of euch secret organizations as now
exist pledge, initiate, accept or attempt to pledge,
initiate or accept a fellow student into membership.
The wearing of jerseys, sweaters. Gaps or other
conspicuous evidence of membership in an unapproved
secret organization is hereby forbidden on the school
premises.
The president or other officer of efery
unapproved secret organization now existing -hall
file with the principal:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Name of organization,
List of all student members,
Hates and places of all meetings,
rregraxas, dates and places of all house
parties or other gatarings, whether occurring
during school year or in short vacations.

The penalty for violations of any of the above
regulations is exclusion from the Haverhill High School.
The principal of the high school may adopt such other
rules and penalties as seem to him best for the close
regulation of such fraternities and sororities as now
exist until they shall pass out of existence and such rules
shall be considered additions to the regulations given
above.1

23.

After the passage of the above law, the high school
principal prepared registration blankB reading as folio?a:
‘ Hy signature signifies that I __ have read
carefully the school conucittee* s regulation*! and promise
on ny honor to observe then.”

while all pupils indicated

by signature that they would adhere to the above law,
soxae violated the rule and pledge and were excluded from
school.
The plaintiff stated

that the School Committee did

not h'iVe power under the law to pass and enforce the rule
in question.
The State Supreme Court rendered the following
decision:
1*

Rule was within the grant of power to the school

committee.
2. Rule was not invalid because it merely forbade
the solicitation and initiation of new members and did
not abolish such societies forthwith.
3. The stated penalty of expulsion from school
for violation of the rule did not exceed the power of
the school committee.
4.

No right guaranteed by the Constitution of the

United States was infringed.
5.

The petitions must be dismissed.

24

PSCK

VS.

SMITH

41 Conn. 442
The defendant, a member of the school committee in
School District #5, was assisting in preparing the fire
in one of the schools of the district.

The defendant

requested the plaintiff, a sixteen year old student, to
remove some chalk marks he had previously made on the
stove pipe.

The plaintiff answered in a saucy manner

becoming uncouth and profane in his language,

When the

plaintiff refused to stop swearing, the defendant laid
his hand upon the plaintiff’s shoulder and using no
unnecessary force, led him out of the school house.

The

teacher arriving at the time of the ejection, heard the
oaths and saw the action of the defendant but made no
objection.
The plaintiff took his books home and did not offer
himself or attempt to return to the school, or complain
to the defendant or to the other members of the school
committee, nor was anything done by the defendant to prevent
his return.
Joseph Taylor, with whom the plaintiff resided, called
on two other members of the school committee, informing
them of the facts and stating that the plaintiff wished to
be placed in school again but they reiused to tax© any
action.

He then called on the board of education of the

25.

town who stated that they had no right to reinstate
the plaintiff.
The plaintiff in pressing charges argued that:
1.

The defendant was liable in trespass, not only

for violence used by him to person of the plaintiff, but
also from the injuries and loss arising from his exx>ulaion
from school.
2.

The defendant did not, under the provisions of

the eighty-fourth (84th)

section of our statute entitled:

"An Act concerning Education,” possess the pov/er of
expulsion.
The State Supreme Court found for the defendant,
ruling that he was justified in peaceably removing the
plaintiff using no unnecessary force for the purpose.

XIDDKR VS. CHELLIS
59 Hew Hampshire 473
The defendant, a teacher in a district school in
ilnfield, after a preliminary interview by the school
committee, began teaching January 22, 1879, without a
certificate.

The certificate was granted by the committee

on the evening of February 3rd.
The plaitniff, a student 18 years of age. having been
given from January 31st to February 3rd to prepare and

26.

deliver an oral topic, was suspended on the morning of
the third until such time as he would deliver the oral
topic.

The plaintiff returned to school in the afternoon

but would not recite and when he refused to leave the
school, he was forcefully ejected by the teacher.
The plaintiff sought damages on the grounds that:
1.

The defendant was not fully inveated with the

office of teacher since he was not in receipt of a
certificate as required by law.
2.

The defendant had no right to make and enforce

the regulation in question, i.e. to require plaintiff to
prepare and deliver an oral topic by a given date and if
such recitation was not made by said date,

to suspend him

from school until such time as he would recite.
The Supreme Court handed down the following decision:
1.

Although not a public teacher by legal appoint¬

ment, he was a teacher in fact anci his authority to govern
the school could not be contested by those who sought to
avail themselves of its advantages.
2.

As no unnecessary force was used to remove the

plaintiff from the room for non-compliance with a reasonable
and useful regulation ofthe school, the plaintiff cannot
recover, and the defendant is entitled to judgment on
the report.

27.

SUMMARY.

The decisions rendered in the State Supreme

Court cases outlined In this section offer the following*
answers to the questions proposed at the beginning of
this chai>ter.

1.

School committee have the authority to make all

reasonable rules for

ihe regulation of the schools and

also to exclude a student for sufficient cause.
2.

School committee have the right to pass laws

limiting or suspending secret organizations composed
wholly or in part of school children.
2.

School committee may expel a student whose

actions off the school premises arc detrimental to the
best interests of the school.
4.

Decisions made by a school cormiittee acting in

good faith on a question within their discretion are not
subject to revision by the courts.
5.

Power of the school committee to govern and

requirement to keep a record of votes does not necessarily
imply that every act in regard to the management of the
school should be confirmed by a formal vote.
5.

School committee must grant a hearing to a

student being excluded from school for misconduct if
pupil so desires.

7.

At a hearing before the school committee, the

student or his counsel is entitled to present all the
facts in the case.
8.

(a)

Powers of the school committee can be

delegated to its ’various members and teachers*
(b)

Persons serving as teachers, although not

legally appointed, are granted the authority necessary
to govern the schools.
9.

Students can be forcefully removed from the

room if no unnecessary force is used.
10.

An individual expelled from school has no

right to bring an action against the town or city without
first appealing to the school committee.

CHAPTHK

III

SCHQIARSHIP.

The pursuit of intellectual training demands that:
1#

Our curricula include informative material,

studies requiring accuracy and those subjects which enable
an individual to express his ideas logically and fluently.
2. Standards be established to which pupils must
attain before being allowed to advance to a higher grade.
This second part of the article from an analysis of
decisions rendered by State Supreme Courts on cases
involving scholarship, proposes answers to the following
questions:
1.

Who possesses the authority to establish the

curriculum and set standards for promotion to an
advanced grade?
2.

Are the decisions of the school committee when

relating to scholarship, subject to change by the courts?
3.

What action nay the Bch^ol committee take if a

student does not conform to the scholarship requirements?
4.

Are the school committee required to give a

hearing to a pupil excluded for failure in his studies?
5.

Are teachers subjeot to direct interference by

parents and members of the community?
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STATUTES QOV ARSING SCHOLARSHIP,

In order to raore clearly

interpret the court decisions outlined in this section,
that portion of the Massachusetts School law involving
scholarship is listed.

HASCAjCHIISSTtS,
Chapter 71, Section 1 (As amended 1921, 360; 1923,
222, S. 1)
Maintenance of public schools.
Every town
shall maintain, for at least one hundred and sixty days
in each school year, unless specifically exempted as to
any one year by the department of education, in this
chapter called the department, a sufficient number of
schools for the instruction of all children who may
legally attend a public school therein.
Such schools
shall be taught by teachers of competent ability and
good morals, and shall give instruction and training in
orthography, reading, writing, the English language
and grammar, geography, arithmetic, drawing, the history
and constitution of the United States, the dutiee of
citisonBhip, physiology and hyglehe, good behavoir,
indoor and outdoor games and athletic exercise.
In
connection with .physiology ami hygiene, instruction as
to the ef ccts of alcoholic drinks and of stimulants and
narcotics on the human system and as to tuberculosis and
its prevention, shall be given to all pupils in all
schools under public control, except schools maintained
solely for Instruction in particular branches,
ouch other
subjects as the school committee considers expedient my
be taught in the public schools.
Chapter 71, Section 2 (As amended 1923, 222; S. 2;
1938, 246).
Teaching of American history, civics.
constitution of the United States, etc.
In all public
elementary and high schools American history and civics,
including the constitution of the United States, and in
all public high schools the constitution of the coiaaonwealth, shall be taught as required subjects for the
purpose of promoting civic service and a greater knowledge
thereof, and of fitting pupils, morally and intellectually,
for the duties of citizenship.
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Chapter 71, Section 37.
Puties of school coiaittee.
It shall have general ciiarge of all the public schools,
inducing the evening schools and evening high schools
and of vocational schools and departments when not
otherwise provided for.
It may determine, subject to this
chapter, the number of weeks and hours during which such
schools shall be in session, and may make regulations
as to attendance therein.

LAW CASES INVOLVING EXPULSION FOR SCHOLARSHIP DgETCIKNCIKS.
A digest of cases in Massachusetts and Vermont in which
students were expelled for failure to satisfy scholarship
standards follows.

JOHN A. WATSON VS. CITY OF CAMBRIDGE
157 Lass. 561
The plaintiff was excluded from the schools in 1835,
"because he was too weak-minded to derive profit from
instruction."

later he was taken on trial for two weeks and

at the end of that time was again excluded.
show that,

Records furthrr

"it appears from the statements of teachers who

have observed him, and from the certificate of physicians,
that he is so weak in mind as not to derive any marks and
benefit from instruction, and, further that he is troublesome
to other children, making uncouth noises, pinching others,
etc.

He is also found unable to take the ordinary decent

care of himself."
The plaintiff sought to recover damages for his exclusion
from the schools of Cambridge by the school cojamittee.

The Superior Court returned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff*
The State Supreme Court, reversing the decision of
the lower court, rendered
1.

the following opinion:

The decision of the school coEsaittec of a city

or town, acting in good faith in the management of the
schools, upon matters of fact directly affecting the good
order and discipline of the schools, is final so far as it
relates

to the right of pupils to enjoy the privileges of

the school*
2.

The school committee have general charge and

superintendence of all the public schools in the town or
city; if the committee act honestly in an effort to do
their duty, a jury composed of men of no special fitness
to decide educational questions should not be permitted
to soy that the answer is wrong*
3*
of

The court rules that in this case, the decision

the school committee is not subject to revision in

the courts*

CXJHTOH ?. BAH3AHD VS* INHABITANTS 0? SHKLBURHS
216 23*80.

19

The plaintiff entered high school in the autumn of
1910 and from the first he fell below the required standard
of excellence in one or more branches of instruction.

33

In Becoinber the father was informed of the
deficiencies with the suggestion that the boy drox> back
to the ninth grade for the remainder of the year to get
a better prei/aration with which to do high school work,
tcnduct of the boy was not responsible for his deficiencies
in studies.
Upon receipt of the letter, the boy remained away from
school until larch; presenting himself at this time, he was
refused admission by the principal until he had seen the
chairman of the school committee.

The boy was informed by

the chairman of the school committee that he could not
re-enter school until he further prepared himself.
On April 10th the father of the plaintiff applied in
writing to

the oohool committee for a statement of the

reasons for exclusion.
Plaintiff brought tort against the town of Shelburne
for alleged wrongful expulsion from the public high school
of that town.
Lower court rendered a verdict for the plaintiff
granting €325.00 for damages sustained.
The State Supreme Court, handing down the following
Judgment, reversed the decision of the lower court:

34.

1.

The duty of care and management of public

echocla which is vested in a school committee,

included

the right to establish and maintain standards for the
promotion of pupils from one grade

to another and for

their continuance in any particular grade; and,
as

the committee act in good

of

such duty,

so long

faith in the performance

their conduct is not subj< ct to review

by any other tribunal*
2.

Where a child has been

coianittee

in good

excluded by a school

faith from a certain school or grade

because of his failure to satisfy the standard of
scholarship set by the school committee for
or grade, and he

that school

is given an opportunity to attend another

school or grade adapted to his ability and accomplishments
there has been no "unlawful exclusion”
the public
3.

of the child from

schools.

Where the ground of exclusion of a child from a

public school is failure in his studies and
the school committee are not required
opportunity for a hearing.

not misconduct,

to give

the pupil an

35.

Kl&iA WULFF VS.

IHHABITAJfTS OF WAXSFI3JJD

221 haas. 427
The defendant,

a teacher in the Wakefield schools,

had appointed a pupil as an assistant to perform the
purely mechanical work of comparing the answers
problems worked

to

out by pupils with the correct answers

contained in a "key book."
A problem in bookkeeping submitted by the plaintiff
was marked wrong by the assistant.

After working on the

problem for another week and a half,

the problem was passed

in and again graded by the assistant as incorrect.
plaintiff worked
submitted

on the problem

the same result to

the

The

additional week and then
teacher who marked

the

answer correct.
The plaintiff in pressing charges argued:
•4

'?

v

ti

;

1.

As a consequence of the error in correcting by

the assistant,

the plaintiff worried, was nervous and lost

her appetite and

2.
and

sleep.

That the method of correcting papers was improper

that the school committee

correct her work.

should

request the teacher to

lending Leering on the abo\e charges,

the plaintiff

did not attend to work, continued to absent herself
nnd for this action, was suspended from school*
The Supreme Court basing its decision on the
Question of whether & parent has the right to say a
certain method of teaching any given course of study
shall be pursued, found for the defendant.
1.

The determination of the procedure and the

znanageitent snd direction of pupils and studies in
this CoiaaonTrealth rests in the wise direction and sound
Judgment of teachers and bchool committees whose action
in these respects are not subject to the supervision of
this court.
2.

The plaintiff was without right in requiring

that the principal personally should attend to the
supervision of her individual work, perhaps to the neglect
of more important duties*
3.

Court does believe that it is a poor policy to

set a rival pupil in Judgment upon the work of an eager
and zealous competitor*

5?

GEORGS GUBRUSBY VS. DAHIE1 *. I XY/CIB
32 Vermont 224
During the school term 1857-1858, the plaintiff, a
boy of eighteen, who resided with his father, refused to
write compositions in school.
The plaintiff was asked by the Prudential Oocsaittee,
who bad supervision over the schools, to either write the
composition as directed by the teacher or to bring a written
request from hie father that he be excused from such
assignment.
When the plaintiff refused to:
1.

write the composition,

2.

bring a written request from his father asking

that he be excused, the Prudential Coraaittee told the
plaintiff that he must not come to school unless he would
obey the

regulations, and instructed the teacher* if he

came, not to treat him r.s a scholar.

At the end of three

weeks during which time he was refused assistance by the
teacher,

the plaintiff stopped attending school.

The lover court rendered
1.

the following opinion:

The requirement of the teacher in regard to compo¬

sitions was reasonable and proper, and that by Judicious
means, she endeavored to induce the plaintiff to comply
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therewith, and that there was no sufficient reason
for hio not complying with it.
2.

If the father of the plaintiff had requested

the teacher not to require the plaintiff to write
compositions, he would hawe been excused therefrom.

3.

Teacher ceased to instruct plaintiff as a

scholar,

• cting under the directions of the rrudential

Committee, because the plaintiff refused to obey the
requirement to write compositions and brought no request
from hie father that he might be excused from so doing.
4.

Plaintiff left the school solely on account of

the teacher1s refusal to instruct him and upon these
facts, the court rendered judgment for the defendant, the
Prudential Committee.

The State Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of
the lower court with the following opinion:
1.
nnd

Statute requires "each organized town to keep

support one or more echccla, provided with competent

teachers,

of good morals, for the instruction of the young

in orthography, reading, writing, English grammar,
geography, arithmetic, history of the Onited States and
good behawoir.**

39,

2.

Regarding those branches which are required

to be taught in the public schools, the Prudential
Committee and the teachers must of necessity have some
discretion as to the order of teaching them, the pupils
v<ho shall be allowed to pursue

these studies and the

mode in which they shall be taught.
3.

In regard to instruction in the specific

branches of common school education, the writing of
English composition in different forms nay be regarded
as an allowable mode of teaching the majority of
subjects,

i.e. grammar, geography

, history.

SUlff/ARY.

These answers to questions proposed at the

beginning of this chapter are obtained from the Supreme
Court decisions rendered in the cases reviewed above:

1.

School committee have a right and a duty to

establish and maintain BtandardB for promotion to and
continuance of pupils in any particular grade.

.

2

Decisions of a school committee acting honestly

in an effort to do their duty are not subject to change
by the courts.

40
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3.

student excluded from a particular grade for

failure to meet scholastic standards hut offered an
opportunity to continue in another grade has not been
wunlawfully excluded*"
4.

School committee are not required to give a

pupil an opportunity for a hearing when exclusion is
■ /

•

i

for failure in studies and not misconduct*
5.

Teachers* under ihe supervision of the school

conirsiittee are responsible for the procedure and method
of instruction in the class room and are not subject
to outside interference*

CHAPTER

IV

PATRIOTISM.

patriotic devotion,
to our flag,

the salute and pledge of allegiance

enkindles in the hearts of students the noble

sentiments of love,

joy, pride, honor and devotion*

This third section of the article proposes to answer
the following questions concerning patriotic ceremonies
in our public schools.
1.

Is the salute to the flag a religious rite or

a patriotic ceremony?
2.

Does

the requirement to salute the flag violate

any rights granted by the state or federal constitution?
3.

What degree of respect is due to the flag of

one’s country?
4.
required
5.

Are all children attending public schools
to salute the flag?
Has the legislature the right to pass a law

requiring public school students to salute the flag?
6.

What action may be taken by a school committee

if a pupil refuses to salute or pledge allegiance to
the flag?

statutes governing patriotic ca.&Mcmias ih thk schools.
The educational laws of the several states governing
patriotic ceremonies in the schools, are listed in order
that the following court decisions may be more clearly
interpreted.
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HASSAGHU8JSTTS.
^action 69 (As amendeu 1935, 258}
Plage, provisions
for anct display —
The School Committee shall provide-—
flags-—.
A flag shall be displayed on school grounds on
every school day — or legal holiday —.
A flag shall
be displayed in each assembly hall-—.
Sach teacher shall
cause the pxipila under his charge to salute the flag and
recite in unison with hira at said openings exercises at
least once each week the "Hedge of Allegiance to the Flag.*
failure— five consecutive days by the principal — to
display the flag — or failure for — two weeks to salute
the flag ana recite said pledge — to cause pupils under
his charge to ao so shall be punished far every such
period by a fine — snail subject members — to a like
penalty.

llSW JJZRSKY.
dy Chapter 145, P. L. 1932, i . 260 - 2Jew Jersey State
Annual 1932, 185-230}
Kvery board of education in this
state is obliged to procure a United States flag for each
school in the district.
The flog is to be displayed upon
or near the public school building during school hours.
It is also necessary to procure for each assembly room
another flag which shall be displayed and pupils are
required to salute the flag, and repeat the oath of
allegiance every school day -- “I pledge allegiance — "
’’with liberty ana justice for all."

G20KGIA.
On March 26, 1935 the General Assembly of Georgia
passed a resolution declaring tiiat:
It is a part of
the duty of every patriotic citizen to x>ledge allegiance
to the fleg of our country and whereas every man, woman
and child of this state owes a similar allegiance to the
flag of Georgia.

44.

LAW CASKS IhVChVIHG iOi/’JLSION FOB FAILURE TO SALUTE
THE FIAG.

The Jehovah Witnesses, plaintiffs in the

following cases, are members of n religious sect who
are conscientiously opposed to saluting the flag since
they consider such action to be a direct violation of
'>

* .

f

*

the divine con;iandacnta laic down in the Bible.
A brief oigost of expulsion cases in Massachusetts,

New York, Hew Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia and
California for failure to conform to existing regulations
governing patriotic ceremonies in the public school
foilowe.

joimnoN

vs.

town of Deerfield

25 Fed. Gupp. 918
On October 14, 1938 the school committee of the
town of Deerfield in accordance with the General laws
relating to education, passed the following resolution:
Voted that all children attending the public
schools in Deerfield be requixveo to salute the flag.
Any infraction from tne rule snail be pen&liseu oy
expulsion from the school until such pupils comply
with this statute."

45.
On Ootober 21, 1938 three pupils, members of the
Jehovah Witnesses, were expelled for refusal to salute
the fla^:*
The plaintiffs brought a bill of complaint before
the district Federal Court for the purpose of obtaining
a declaratory judgment decreeing a statute of Massachusetts
on which the above rule was based void, ns violating the
rights secured to the plaintiff by the Constitution of the
United

States*

In presenting their case the plaintiffs,

three minor children and their father, argued:
1.

The flag salute law deprives

then without due

process of law of liberties guaranteed to them by the
fourteenth (14th) amendment of the Constitution.
a.

liberties under the fourteenth (14th)

amendment are right of religious freedom and the right to
obtain an education in the public schools.
b.

Statute requiring flag salute when considered

in connection with the laws of l£assachueetts compelling
school attendance abridges these liberties.
2.

^ince

they honestly and conscientiously believe

that the salute to the flag is a religious rite,
belief prevails and the law must yield to it.

their
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3. The law does not accomplish its intended purpose.
The district Federal Court reviewing the case, handed
down the following decision January 4, 1939:
1.

The flag salute and pledge of allegiance here in quest!o

do not in any just sense relate to religious worship—~ they are
wholly patriotic in design and purpose.
2.

The salute and pledge do not go beyond what is due to

government.
3.

— -nothing in the salute— which constitutes an act

of idolatry-— or strains a human being in respect to worshipping
God within the meaning of the words of the Constitution.
4.

—rule and statues— within the competency of

legislative authority—- nothing in opposition to religiondirected to a justifiable end— education in the public schools.
5.

Statute does not Impair plaintiffs’ religious liberty in

violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth (14th)
amendment.
6.

Enacted statute upheld by the Court of Massachusetts

as within the power of the legislature today as a proper
regulation of the public schools supported by the state.
7.

—one cannot excuse a practice contrary to statute

because of a religious belief.

Chief Justice Vttiite— to permit

this would be— in effect to permit every citizen to become
a law unto himself.
8.

Argument that the law does not accomplish its

intended xAirpooe might properly be addressed to the legislative
than to the court.

47.

9.

Plaintiff* a application Tor interlocutory

injunction la deniau.

KICHQX13 Ts.

mayor

We dismiss bill of complaint.

hto pgrqql CQHS&ft&s

OF LYNii t UASSACIPTSSTl’E
H. S. 2d Ld. - 577
The school committee of Lynn, Massachusetts,

in

accordance witbthe General Laws relating to education,
enacted
1.

the following law:
Lynn School Rule 18 ™ Salute to the Flag.

The following salute to the f3 ag shall be given in every
school at least once a week and at ouch tines as occasion
may warrant.

“I pledge allegiance —— with liberty and

justice for all."
At the opening of school, September 1935,

it was

observed that the petitioner, a male child, while stand¬
ing during the salute and recitation of the pledge, was
otherwise taking no port therein.
On September 30, 1935 there was repeated a refusal
by the petitioner to join in the salute to the flag and
the pledge of allegiance as a part of the opening
fxercises.
The school committee expelled the petitioner October
8,

1935 after a hearing before the father represented by

counsel and respondents, until such time as by his own
free will he would comply with the rule.

48.

The plaintiff flecking a writ of mandamus to compel
the school authorities to admit him to the school,
Justified Mb action, failure to salute and pledge
allegiance to the flag, as follows:
1.

Article 2 of the declaration of Rights of the

Constitution of this Commonwealth, "no subject will be •*«.—
restrained —- from worshipping God-to the dictates of

Ma own conscience of religious sentiments; provided he
does not disturb the public pence or obstruct others in
their religioue worship, "
2.

Section 1 of Article 18 of the Amendments of the

Constitution of hassachuoetto as found in Article 46 of
the Amendments,

"No law shall be passed prohibiting the

free exorcise of religion."
3.

No child

shall be excluded from a public school

of any town on account or.

race, color or religion.

The Supreme Judicial Court of &assachusetts rendered
the following decleion April 1, 1037:
1.

The flag salute and pledge of allegiance here in

question do not in any sense relate to religion.

They are

wholly patriotic in design and purpose.
2.

The salute and pledge do not go beyond that which,

according to generally recognised i->rincii>lee, is due to
government.

There is nothing in the salute or pledge of

allegiance which apxnroacheo to any religious observance.

49.
It does not in any reasonably sense hurt, molest or
restrain a human being in respect to ’’worshipping God*
within tiie meaning of the words of the Constitution,
3.

Rule eighteen

(18) of the school committee is

not invalid and the petloner fails to show that any
of his rights have been violated,
4,

The petition is dismissed,

HKRIBQ VS. STATE BOARi> 07 EDUCATION (NEW JERSEY)
117 HJL - 455
189
A - 629
In 1936 a child was expelled from public school by
the btate Board of Education of New Jersey for failure
to salute the flag and give the oath of allegiance
every day.
The plaintiffs,

John and Kiln Bering and children,

sought a writ of mandamus to compel the school authori¬
ties to return the plaintiff to school.

It was the

contention of the plaintiffs that statute requiring salute
to

the flag was invalid as infringing the constitutional

and statutory guarantees of equal free schools for all
people•
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey,
reviewing the case, rendered the following decision:
1.

Those who resort to educational institutions

maintained with the state’s money are subject to the
commands of the state.

50.

2.

The perforraance of the eoLsnaml of the statute

in question could in no sense interfere with religious
freedom.

’ledge of allegiance is not a religious rite;

it i8 a patriotic ceremony which tht! legislature has
the power to require of those attending schools estab~
lisheb at public expense.
3.
thr

A child of tchool age is not required to attend

institutions maintained by the public, but is required

to attend a suitable school.
conform with th*

Those who do not desire to

commands of the statute can seek their

schooling elsewhere.
4.

The order of expulsion und*r review i» affirmed

and the writ is dismissed.

JOBS AH) TLLA EKHllO VS. STATK BuAHU 07 EDUCATIGH
of stat*£ of uv J::nsHY

•£-’

■

303 0. 3. 624
82 L. Ed. 1087
*

The decision on an appeal to the United States Supreme
Court by the plaintiffs from the Court of Errors and
Appeals of the State of Kew Jersey, follows.

(Details of

case appear in previous digest.)
The Supreme Court of the United States on Karch 14,
1938 ruled to dismiss the appeal foe want of a substantial
Federal question. §
— ;qitn\nnni for want of a substantial !ftederaX question,
means that every question brought to the court is *eo
clearly not debateable and utterly lacking in merit
as to require dismissal for want of substance.

l^OLEU

VS.

lAHDEBS

192 S.S. 218
In 1935 the Board of Education of the City of
Atlanta passed a resolution requiring all pupils in
the city schools to participate in patriotic exercises
including individual salute to the United States flag,
as lawful and reasonable and in keeping with the policy
of instructing youth in devotion to the American
Constitution, institutions and ideals.
The petitioner, Dorothy Leoles, refused to salute
the flag as required by tho city board of education,
and w&b expelled.
The petitioner then sought a writ of mandamus to
compel the school authorities to readmit her to school.
She justified her position, refusal to salute the flag,
with the following arguments:
1•

The plaintiff
a.

refused to Balute the flag for the sole

reason that she believes to do so is an
act of worship of nn image or emblem;
b.

did not refuse to pledge allegiance;

c.

1b a good and loyal citizen of the United
states and City of Atlanta;

d.

believes in the American form of government

o.

contends that conformity to the regulation
in question "salute to flag of the United
States*', denies equal protection of the law

52 *
due process of the law and further infringes
the provisions of trie state constitution
prohibiting the establishment of religion
and securing to her religious freedom

nd

seeks to compel her to act in disobedience
to her religious beliefs and teachings.

The Superior Court dismissed the writ of mandamus.
The plaintiff brought error and the case was
reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia which handed
down the following Judgment:
1.

The United States is a land of freedom; however,

those who reside within itsllimits and receive the
protection and benefits afforded tu them must obey its
laws and show due respect to the government, its
institutions and ideals.

The flag of the United States

is a symbol thereof; disrespect to the flag is disrespect
to the government, its institutions and ideals and is
directly opposed to the policy of this state.
2.

The regulation requiring "salute to the flag" does

not violate the fundamental rights and provisions of the
Constitution of Georgia.
3.

Those choosing to resort to the educational

institutions maintained with the funds of tne state are
subject to the commando of the state.

4#

The rule and regulation of the board of

education of Atlanta, requiring the students of the
public schools hereof to salute the flag of the United
States,

in no common-sense view thereof really inter¬

feres with the plaintiff’s religious freedom.
5.
rite;

The act of saluting the flag is not a religious

it is an act showing one’s respect for the

government.
6.

A child is not required to attend public school

if suitable education can be obtained from some other
school giving instruction in the ordinary brandies of
the iSngliah education.

LEOLKS

V 3.

XJUP3RS

302 U. S. 656
82 L.Ed. 507
The decision on an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court by the plaintiff from the Supreme Court
of the State of Georgia, follows.

(Details of case

appear in previous digest.)
On December 13, 1937 the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled:
1.

The motion of the appellees to dismiss the

appeal is granted and the appeal is dismissed for
want of a substantial Federal question. #--

# . Dismissal for want of a substantial Federal question
means that every question brought to the court is
wso clearly not debateable and utterly lacking in
merit as to require dismissal for want of substance.

54.

rEOirrs

VS.

S AED3TRG&

18 JJ. B. 340
The plaintiff, Grace I’andstrom, thirteen (13)
years rf age, refused to salute and pledge allegiance
to the flag of cause it was contrary to the rcligionn
of the Jehovah

-itnosses of which the ia a member.

After each refusal to salute the flag, the girl v*ns
sent home and was again returned to school by the
parents.
The plaintiff sought dauageo on the grounds that
the demand to salute the flag is in violation of the
State Constitution (Art.

1, Sec. 3) which reads:

*The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
unci worship,without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed in this state to all unkind;
and no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a
witness on account of his opinion on matters of
reiigiouc belief;

cut the liberty of confidence hereby

secured shall not be so construed as to excuse act
of licentiousness, or Justify practices inconsistent
with pea~e or safety of thin state."
The Stitte 3u;>reme Court handed down the following
decision:

55.

1*

salute to the flag is in no sense an act

of worship or species of idolatry nor does it consti¬
tute any approach to u religious observance.
2.

Since public opinion is vital to the maintenance

of good government the state is justified

in taking such

measures as will engender and maintain patriotism in
the schools.
3.

Grace in attending school provided by the

state for her education should have participated in
the ceremony with thr; other scholars.
4.

The plaintiff ia not entitled to damages.

oaiiRiiaix

vs.

jqnciomoGK^

82 lac. 391 (Cal.)
Charlotte Gabrieli!, nin*

years of age, was

expelled from Fremont School, a public school in the
city of ocremento, for persistently refusing to
participate in a ceremony of saluting and pledging
allegiance to the flag.

3he refused to salute the flag

because, being a member of the Jehovah Witnesses, it
was contrary to her religious teaching.
The plaintiff applied to the Superior Court in
^ncremento County for a writ of mandate addressed

to

the authorities of the iiacremento School District, to

.
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compel her reinstatement aa a pupil of the Fremont
uChool.

In supporting her contention that she hah

been illegally expelled, she presented the following
arguments;
1.

The expulsion a.

has deprived h r of her right to attend

the public schools without clue process of law in
violation of the fourt enth (14th) amendment.
b.

constitutes a denial of the religious

liberty guaranteed to

the petitioner by the State

And Federal Constitution.
The Sup rior Court ieoued a judgment directing
issuance of the peremptory writ.
The defendants appealed to the State Supreme Court
which, reversing thr judgment of the lower court,
rendered the following opinion;
1.

The Supreme Court of the United States has

twice dismissed appeal taken from state court judgments
upholding the validity of regulations requireing the
salute and pledge of allegiance to the flag as applied
to pupils objecting on religious grounds.

The action

of said court in disposing of these appeals cannot be
taken in any other sense than that no violation of
respondent’s constitutional right in the instant
case has been committed by the act of excluding

respondent from attendance at said public school
until she shall comply with the rule which she
refugee to obey.
2.

e are of the view tiiat the rule prescribed

by tiie board does not abridge any of the respondent’s
constitutional rights by excluding her from attendance
at the Saoremento city public school until such time
as she shall comply with the rule nhich she refuses
to obey*
3*

The legislature has conferred upon school

boards, broad plenary powers to make all reasonable
regulations that will, in the reasonable exercise of
Judgment, promote the efficiency of the school system
in performing public welfare duties*

It is only where

regulations are clearly shown to be in violation of
the fundamental law that the court may annul them*
We see no violation of any article of the federal or
state constitution in the board*s exercise of power
in the present case*
4.

The Judgment is reversed and the writ is

discharged
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SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. GOBITIS
21 Fed. Supp. - 581
On November 6,

1935 the school directors of the

borough of Kinersville, bchuylkill County, Pennsylvania,
adopted a school regulation requiring all teachers and
pupils of the schools to salute the American flog as a
part of the daily exercises and providing that refusal to
salute the flag should be regarded a« an act of insub¬
ordination and should be dealt with accordingly.
A few days later, the minor plaintiffs in this
case, refused to salute the flag, and were expelled.
The plaintiffs, members of the Jehovah Witnesses,
then sought a bill of complaint to compel the school
authorities to remove the participation in the ceremony
of saluting the flag as a condition of the attendance of
the plaintifffs children at school.

They justified

their

position with the following arguments:
1.

The regulation requiring salute to the flag

violated the fourteenth (14th) amendment in that it un¬
reasonably restricts the freedom of religious belief
and worship.
2.

The plaintiffs are required to attend the

defendant’s public schools since they are financially
unable to go elsewhere; by reason of the regulation in
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question, they are placed under legel compulsion to
participate in an act of worship contrary to dictates
of conscience.
The lower court found for the plaintiff.

The

defendants then moved to have the District Federal Court
dismiss the bill of complaint against them.
The following decision was given December ig 1937
by the District Federal Court:
1.

Kinor plaintiffs h ve a right to attend public

schools and indeed a duty to do so if they are unable
to secure an equivalent education privately.
2.

This court cannot yield to any doctrine which

would permit public officers to determine whether the
views of individuals sincerely undertaken on religious
grounds are in fact based on convictions religious in
character;

to do so would be to sound the death knell

of religious liberty.
3.

Action of minor defendants in refusing for

conscience sake to salute the flag, a ceremony which they
deem an ROt of worship,

to be rendered to God alone, was

within the rights of conscience guaranteed by the
i ennsylvania Constitution._
4.

Requirement of that ceremony as condition of

the exercising of their right or

the performance of their

duty to attend public schools violated the Pennsylvania
Constitution and infringed the liberty guaranteed them
by the fourteenth (14th) amendment.
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5*
1.

Courts who have reached a contrary conclusion,

e. salute to the flag could have no religious

significance— overlooked this fundamental principle
of religious liberty,

"no man, even though he be a

school director or a Judge,

is empowered to censor

anotherfs religious convictions or set bounds to the
areao

of human conduct in wi;ich those convictions should

be permitted to control his actions, unless compelled to
do so by an over-riding public necessity which properly
requires the exercise of the police power.”
6.

Refusal to salute the flag in school exercises

could not in any way prejudice or imperil the public
safety, health or morals or
rights of

7.

the property or personal

their fellow citizens.
The motion to dismiss bill denied.

liXHXiSVILLK SCHOOL DISTRICT

VS.

GOBITIS

108 Fed. Supp. 2d - 683
The decision on an appeal

to the Circuit Court of

Appeals, Third Circuit, by the defendant from the
District Federal Court, follows.
in previous digest).

(Details of case appear
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In a decision rendered on November 10, 1939,
the Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit,
affirmed

the decision of the District Court.

If INKR8VILH3 SCHOOL DISTRICT VS. G0BITI3
310 0. S. 586
84 L. Ifld. 1375
The decision on an appeal to the United States
Supremo Court by the defendants from the Circuit Court
of Appeale, Third Circuit, follows.

(Details of case

appeal* in previous digest.)
On June 3, 1940 the Supreme Court of the United
States with Judtices Franlcfurter and Reynolds in agreement,
and Justice Stone dissenting, reversed the decisions of
the lower courts and dismissed the bill of complaint
against

the defendants.

This lias been the last c&ae to appear before the
Supreme Court involving refusal to salute the flag and
the decision rendered in thi3 instance will be understood
to mean that there is nothing in the requirement to salute
the flag which is in violation of the rights granted to
us in our Federal Constitution.
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SIBGEARY.

the Stato and Federal Supreme Court cases

reviewed in this section answer these questions
proposed at the beginning of this chapter.
1*

Flag salute and pledge of allegiance do not

relate to religious worship but are wholly patriotic
in design and purpose.

2.

Statutes requiring flag salute and pledge of

allegiance do not impair plaintiff’s roligious liberty
in violation of the due process clause of the four¬
teenth (14th) amendment.
3.

Nothing in the law which restrains a human being

in respect to worshipping God within the meaning of
the words of the Constitution.
4.

(a)

Salutes and pledges do not go beyond that

which, according to generally recognized principles, is
due to government.
4.

(b)

Since the flag of the United States is a

symbol thereof, disrespect to the flag is disrespect to
the government,
5.

its institutions and ideals.

Those who resort to educational institutions

maintained with the state’s money are subject to the
commands of the state.
6.

Hedge of allegiance is a patriotic ceremony

which the legislature has the power to require of those
attending schools established at public expense*
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CHAPTER

V.

CONCLUSIOK.

This study has offered an analysis of State and
Federal Supreme Court decisions involving expulsion from
public schools for deficiencies in discipline, scholar¬
ship and x>atriotism.
From the court cases reviewed in this paper,

it

becomes etident that if a school coianittee act with
reasonable judgment and in good faith,

they may, by

following the procedures set down in the statutes:
1.

expel

pupils whose actions on or off the

school grounds are detrimental to the best interests
of the schools.
2.

exclude from a particular grade those pupils

who fail to meet the scholastic standards.
3.

expel pupils who refuse to meet the requirements

to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag.
In addition to the right to expel for the above
deficiencies, the court decisions further show that
the school committee may:
1.

pass laws limiting or suspending secret

organizations composed wholly or in part of school
children.
2.

justify the use of corporal punishment.

3.

delegate its power to its various members and

teachers *

65.
4.

make all reasonable rules for the regulation

of the schools.
5.

establish and maintain standards for promotion

and continuance in any one grade.
6.

grant hearings to pupils being excluded for

misconduct; refuse to grant hearings to pupils being
excluded for scholarship deficiencies.
7.

protect thr

teaching methods of the instructors

from outside influence.
8.

require all students attending public schools

to obey the laws governing these chools.

The decisions rendered also show that the school
committees in administering our public school

system

are exercising these powers in an equitable and just
manner*
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